Transferring computations for cognitive radio network (CRN) management to a computer cloud opens the possibility to implement new, possibly more accurate and powerful resource management strategies. Algorithms to discover communication channels currently in use by a primary transmitter and identify malicious nodes with high probability could be based on past history; when the trust is computed by the mobile devices this approach is not feasible because such algorithms require massive amounts of data and intensive computations. In this paper, we introduce a cloud service based on a novel trust management algorithm; this solution, applicable to infrastructure-based and to ad hoc CRNs, ensures secure and robust operation in the presence of malicious nodes. We discuss the economic benefits, scalability and robustness of the proposed service for different network configurations and parameters.
Introduction and motivation
Mobile devices are ubiquitous nowadays and their use will continue to increase. Clouds are emerging as the computing and the storage engines of the future for a wide range of applications. There is a symbiotic relationship between the two; mobile devices can consume, as well as produce very large amounts of data, while computer clouds have the capacity to store and deliver such data to the user of a mobile device. To exploit the potential of this symbiotic relationship we propose a new cloud service for the management of wireless networks. At a time when mobile applications are increasingly more popular this service will allow applications running on mobile devices to gain more effective and cheaper access to cloud services, for several reasons (Armbrust et al., 2009): 1 the convenience of data access from any site connected to the internet 2 the data transfer rates of wireless networks are increasing; the time to transfer data to and from a cloud is no longer a limiting factor.
A communication network is a complex system with multiple components; in traditional networks each component attempts to optimise its own performance without concern for the end-to-end effect. For example, a router may drop packets to avoid overflowing its buffers, without the concern that this leads to retransmissions, thus, to increase network congestion and end-to-end delays. To ensure optimal end-to-end performance the components of a cognitive radio network (CRN) dynamically adapt to network conditions using a range of techniques borrowed from several areas including machine learning, knowledge representation, and trust and network management. The available communication spectrum is a precious commodity and the objective of a CRN is to use the communication bandwidth effectively, while attempting to avoid interference with licensed users. Two main functions necessary for the operation of a CRN are spectrum sensing and spectrum management; the former detects unused spectrum and the later decides the optimal use of the available spectrum. Spectrum sensing in CRNs is based on information provided by the nodes of the network. The nodes compete for the free channels and some may supply deliberately distorted information to gain advantage over the other nodes; thus, trust determination is critical for the management of CRNs.
The mobile devices have limited resources; while new generations of smart phones and tablet computers are likely to use multi-core processors and have a fair amount of memory, power consumption is still, and will continue to be in the near future, a major concern; thus, it seems reasonable to delegate compute-and data-intensive tasks to the cloud. The motivation for the application discussed in this paper is to delegate computeand data-intensive tasks to the cloud, to reduce the power consumption of the mobile devices.
Transferring computations related to CRN management to a cloud supports the development of new, possibly more accurate resource management algorithms. For example, algorithms to discover communication channels currently in use by a primary transmitter could be based on past history, but are not feasible when the trust is computed by the mobile device. Such algorithms require massive amounts of data and can also identify malicious nodes with high probability.
Mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets are able to communicate using two networks: 1 a cellular wireless network 2 a WiFi network.
The service we propose assumes that a mobile device uses the cellular wireless network to access the cloud, while the communication over the WiFi channel is based on cognitive radio (CR). The amount of data transferred using the cellular network is limited by the subscriber's data plan, but no such limitation exists for the WiFi network. The cloud service discussed in this paper will allow mobile devices to use the WiFi communication channels in a CRN environment and will reduce the operating costs for the end-users.
While the focus of this paper is on trust-management for CRN networks, the cloud service can be used for a broad ranger of tasks besides the bandwidth management; for example, routing in a mobile ad-hoc networks (Marti et al., 2000) , detection and isolation of non-cooperative nodes, and other network management and monitoring functions could benefit from the identification of malicious nodes.
Basic concepts and related work
This paper introduces a cloud service for an application based on a new technology. In this section we discuss concepts related to this new technology such as: cellular and WiFi networks, spectrum management, CRNs, trust management, and Byzantine attacks in CRNs. We also mention the literature relevant to each one of these topics.
As noted earlier, mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets communicate using two networks which operate in different regions of the spectrum, cellular networks and WiFi. We start our discussion with a brief presentation of the two networks.
Cellular networks
Mobile phones are also called cellular phones because they use a cellular radio network to communicate. The coverage area of a cellular radio network is divided into cells, usually of regular shape, e.g., hexagonal. The base station in each cell is assigned a communication channel in such a manner that neighbouring cells do not interfere with each other. This allows the cellular network to reuse the communication channels; the carrier frequency of a channel can be reused in a non-adjacent cell at a distance D provided that
with R the radius of a cell and N the number of cells in the cluster. In a city a cell may have a range of approximately 1 kilometre, while in an open area the range could be 40 times larger. Cellular networks use either frequency division multiple access (FDMA) or code division multiple access (CDMA). For example, 4G is the fourth generation cellular wireless standard, with peak speed of 100 Mbps for highly mobile communication (e.g., cars and trains) and 1 Gbps for low mobile or stationary users (e.g., pedestrians); 4G is expected to support secure services not only for cellular telephony, but also for gaming and streamed multimedia and to ensure smooth handover across heterogeneous networks. Any mobile device with a data plan can connect to the internet via a 3G or 4G cellular network.
The sets of frequency allocated for cellular networks has changed over the years; initially, the cellular phones were able to operate only in regions supporting the standard they were built for. Now, the GSM standard allows a cellular phone to operate on several continents; some GSM phones are tri-band, i.e., support three bands, 0.9 or 0.85, 1.8, and 1.9 GHz others are quad-bands, i.e., support communication in four bands, 0.85, 0.9, 1.8, and 1.9 GHz. The coverage area and the number of devices that can communicate simultaneously depend on the frequency used; lower frequencies cover a larger area, while higher frequencies allow carriers to provide service to more customers in a smaller area.
Wireless local networks (WiFi)
WiFi is a technology that allows a device equipped with a wireless network interface to connect to a local area network (LAN) via an access point also called a hotspot; WiFi communication is described by the IEEE 802.11 standards. Wireless ad-hoc networks do not use an access point; individual nodes act as virtual hotspots. The range of WiFi networks is limited to less than 30 metres indoor and 90 metres outdoors function of their antennas and the frequency they operate at. The WiFi networks using the 5.0 GHz frequency bloc have a smaller range than the ones using the 2.4 frequency block; the Bluetooth wireless technology has a range of less than 10 metres.
While a GSM cellular phone can only operate in areas covered by the provider of service, standard WiFi devices can operate anywhere in the world. Though there are serious concerns regarding the security of WiFi networks, they are very popular in airports, malls, stadiums, and other public places; some cities such as Sunnyvale, California offer city-wide free WiFi access. Public access is supported in London using wireless mesh networks.
Spectrum management
The electro-magnetic spectrum is a precious commodity, a treadable resource available in limited supply; its allocation is a matter of international agreements. The exponential demands posed by modern communication technologies, including wireless data, audio, and video transmissions demand policies to optimise its use.
Different regions of the spectrum are allocated to: cell phones, broadcast television and audio, mobile radio, GPS systems, satellite TV, WiFi, RFID devices such as product tags, passports, and active badges, radar for air-traffic control, vehicle-speed control, weather monitoring, Citizen's band radio, Bluetooth, and so on. More information about the spectrum allocation is available at http://transition.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec7.html.
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC), the US Government organisation in charge with the spectrum management, periodically auctions bandwidth regions and wireless network providers acquire licenses to use these channels. Licence violations have legal consequences and wireless service providers have developed technologies to avoid such situations.
Increased network complexity, scarcity of available spectrum, under utilisation of allocated spectrum and quality of service (QoS) requirements justify the research effort dedicated to CRNs.
Cognitive radio networks
Research in the last decade reveals a significant temporal and spatial under-utilisation of the allocated spectrum. Thus, the motivation to opportunistically harness the vacancies of spectrum at a given time and place.
The original goal of cognitive radio, first proposed at Bell Labs (Mitola and Maguire, 1999, Mitola, 2000) , was to develop a software-based radio platform which allows a reconfigurable wireless transceiver to automatically adapt its communication parameters to network availability and to user demands. Today the focus of cognitive radio is on spectrum sensing (Buddhikot and Ryan, 2005; Haykin, 2005; Atakli et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2009) .
We recognise two types of devices which coexist in the electro magnetic spectrum namely the primary and secondary; primary nodes/devices have exclusive rights to specific regions of the spectrum, while secondary nodes/devices enjoy dynamic spectrum access and are able to use a channel, provided that the primary, licensed to use that channel, is not communicating. Once a primary starts its transmission, the secondary using the channel is required to relinquish it and identify another free channel to continue its operation; this mode of operation is called an overlay mode.
CRNs are often based on cooperative spectrum sensing strategy. In this mode of operation each node determines the occupancy of the spectrum based on its own measurements combined with information from its neighbours and then shares its own spectrum occupancy assessment with its neighbours (Ganesan and Li, 2005; Sun et al., 2007a Sun et al., , 2007b .
Information sharing is necessary because a node alone cannot determine the true spectrum occupancy. Indeed, a secondary node has a limited transmission and reception range; node mobility combined with typical wireless channel impairments such as multi path fading, shadowing, and noise add to the difficulties of gathering accurate information by a single node.
Individual nodes of a centralised, or infrastructure-based CRN, send the results of their measurements regarding spectrum occupancy to a central entity, be it a base station, an access point, or a cluster head. This entity uses a set of fusion rules to generate the spectrum occupancy report and then distributes it to the nodes in its jurisdiction. The area covered by such networks is usually small as global spectrum decision are affected by the local geography.
There is another mode of operation based on the idea that a secondary node operates at a much lower power lever than a primary one. In this case the secondary can share the channel with the primary as long as its transmission power is below a threshold, μ, that has to be determined periodically. In this scenario, the receivers wishing to listen to the primary are able to filter out the 'noise' caused by the transmission initiated by secondaries if the signal-to-noise ratio, (S/N), is large enough.
We are only concerned with the overlay mode where by a secondary node maintains an occupancy report, which gives a snapshot of the current status of the channels in the region of the spectrum it is able to access. The occupancy report is a list of all the channels and their state, e.g., 0 if the channel is free for use and 1 if the primary is active. Secondary nodes continually sense the channels available to them to gather accurate information about available channels.
The secondary nodes of an ad hoc CRN compete for free channels and the information one node may provide to its neighbours could be deliberately distorted. Also malicious nodes may send false information to the fusion centre in a centralised CRN. Malicious node's intent could be to deny the service or to cause other secondary nodes to violate spectrum allocation rules. To deny the service a node will report that free channels are used by the primary. To entice the neighbours to commit FCC violations, the occupancy report will show that channels used by the primary are free. This attack strategy is called secondary spectrum data falsification (SSDF) or Byzantine attack. Thus, trust determination is a critical issue for CR networks.
Trust
The actual meaning of trust is domain and context specific. Consider for example networking; at the medium access control (MAC)-layer the multiple-access protocols assume that all senders follow the channel access policy, e.g., in CSMA-CD a sender senses the channel and then attempts to transmit if no one else does. In a store-and-forward network trust assumes that all routers follow a best-effort policy to forward the packets towards their destination.
In the context of cognitive radio trust is based on the quality of information regarding the channel activity provided by a node. The status of individual channels can be assessed by each node based on the results of its own measurements combined with the information provided by its neighbours, as is the case of several algorithms discussed in the literature Sun et al., 2007a) .
The alternative we propose in this paper is to have a cloud-based service which collects information from individual nodes, evaluates the state of each channel based on the information received, and supplies this information on demand. Evaluation of the trust and identification of untrustworthy nodes are critical for both strategies (Parvin et al., 2010) .
SSDF or Byzantine attacks
Preventing SSDF attacks can rely on malicious node detection (Li and Han, 2010) ; it can also be based on robust fusion of advertised data in a centralised CRN where the algorithm runs on a fusion centre.
The k-proximity algorithm, a technique used in data-mining, can also be used to catch the attackers (Li and Han, 2010) . Consider a CRN with one primary transmitter, N secondary nodes, M of them being malicious, and a data fusion centre. The algorithm attempts to identify nodes located far apart from the majority of most secondary nodes in the history space during at most T sensing periods; the distance can be either the Euclidean distance or the Hamming distance.
Defending against Byzantine attacks in collaborative spectrum sensing is a challenging and, as the same time, a very important problem; a Byzantine attack occurs when several malicious nodes advertise spurious occupancy reports that lead to a wrong spectrum sensing decision. According to Chen et al. (2008) , a fusion centre should collect sensing reports over an extended period of time.
An insightful analysis of Byzantine attacks in a CR network is given in Anand et al. (2011) and some of its findings are discussed next. To model such attacks call ,
the probability of detection and of a false alarm, respectively, for a honest node and , , 
while the probability that the fusion centre decides that the primary is transmitting is given by
The relative entropy, D(X || Y), also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-distance), is a non-symmetric measure of the difference between two probability distributions X and Y
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This distance is used as a performance metrics. The malicious nodes attempt to reach the so called 'blind fusion centre' state when D(X || Y) = 0 and the fusion centre is unable to distinguish between the probability distribution used to decide that the primary is transmitting and the probability distribution that the primary is not transmitting; then, the optimum strategy for malicious nodes carrying out a Byzantine attack requires that
If we assumed that and
then α blind , the value of α to minimise
If a malicious node decides to carry out a Byzantine attack based on its own observation then
When the interactions between the fusion centre and the malicious nodes is modelled as a minimax game the best strategy for both players is the saddle point. In the general case, minimisation of the probability of error P e is hard.
A cloud service for trust management
The cognitive radio literature typically analyses networks with a relatively small number of nodes active in a limited geographic area; thus, all nodes in the network sense the same information on channel occupancy and this could lead to less complex algorithms for the determination of trust. Yet, the density of the mobile nodes in such a small network can vary significantly; in the distributed spectrum sensing mode of operation, trust determination and spectrum occupancy will place an increased load on the nodes with many neighbours in high node density areas. The cost of the management of such small networks is considerable for the centralised approach as well. We consider networks with a much larger number of nodes distributed over a large geographic area. The signals from two primary nodes P i transmitting on a channel i and P j transmitting on a channel j sensed by a secondary node could differ by one or more orders of magnitude in strength because P i is considerably further to the secondary node than P j . Thus, the information available to the secondary node about channel i with a very low signal to noise ratio is less reliable than one about channel j. The attenuation of the signal strengths with the distance is the reason we group the secondary nodes in several rings around every primary tower; this strategy combined with ring-based fusion rules allows for more accurate trust evaluation.
The service we propose benefits from cloud elasticity, it will only use the resources needed regardless of the size of the area, the number of primary and secondary nodes, the variations of node density, and of the node mobility. There are other notable advantages of a cloud based service for CRNs for example it could easily accommodate heterogeneity of such networks.
It is expected that multiple operators with different types of secondary networks will provide access to the next generation wireless networks. A cloud management service is better equipped to support the necessary abstractions, as well as, the complex deployment, implementation, coexistence and policy issues that arise in such a heterogeneous environment. Today's WiFi access points do not support the functionality required to maintain a CRN and adding it will require changes in existing applications programming interfaces. But such changes can be easily accommodated when the service runs on a cloud. Most cellular networks or base stations have a backhaul link to internet and this link can be used to communicate with the cloud service which maintains the history of observations of node behaviour and the trust map. This greatly adds to the portability of the next generation wireless networks. Our results discussed in Section 4 show the robustness of the algorithm for high node density as well as a large ratio of malicious activities nodes.
The benefits of a centralised trust management in CRNs
A cloud service for trust management in cognitive networks can have multiple technical as well as economical benefits . The service is likely to have a broader impact that the one discussed in this paper, it could be used to support a range of important policies in wireless network where many decisions require the cooperation of all nodes. A history-based algorithm to evaluate the trust and to detect malicious nodes with high probability is at the centre of the solution we propose.
A centralised, history-based algorithm for bandwidth management in CR networks has several advantages over the distributed algorithms discussed in the literature:
• Reduces drastically the computations a mobile device is required to carry out to identify free channels and to avoid penalties associated with interference with primary transmitters.
• Allows a secondary node get information about channel occupancy as soon as it joins the system and later on demand; this information is available even when a secondary node is unable to receive reports from its neighbours, or when it is isolated.
• Does not require the large number of assumptions critical to the distributed algorithms.
• The dishonest nodes can be detected with high probability and their reports can be ignored; thus in time the accuracy of the results increases. Moreover, historic data could help detect a range of Byzantine attacks orchestrated by a group of malicious nodes.
• Is very likely to produce more accurate results than the distributed algorithm as the reports are based on information from all secondary nodes reporting on a communication channel used by a primary, not only those in its vicinity; a higher node density increases the accuracy of the predictions. The accuracy of the algorithm is a function of the frequency of the occupancy reports provided by the secondary nodes.
The centralised trust management scheme has several other advantages. First, it can be used not only to identify malicious nodes and provide channel occupancy reports but also to manage the allocation of free channels. In the distributed case two nodes may attempt to use a free channel and collide; this situation is avoided in the centralised case. At the same time, malicious nodes can be identified with high probability and be denied access to the spectrum usage or their occupancy reports totally ignored or dropped.
The server could also collect historic data regarding the pattern of behaviour of the primary nodes and use this information for the management of free channels. For example, when a secondary requests access for a specific length of time the service may attempt to identify a free channel likely to be available for that time.
The trust management may also be extended to other network operations such as routing in a mobile ad-hoc network; the strategy in this case would be to avoid routing through malicious nodes.
Model assumptions
We assume a generic fading model given by the following expression
where i k γ is the received signal strength on channel k at location of node i, A is the frequency constant, 2 ≤ α ≤ 6 is path loss factor, s ik is the distance between primary tower P k and node i, and T k is the transmission power of primary tower P k transmitting on channel k.
In our discussion, we consider K channels labelled 1, 2,…,K; a primary transmitter P k transmits on channel k. The algorithm is based on several assumptions regarding the secondary nodes, the behaviour of malicious nodes, and the geometry of the system. First, we assume that the secondary nodes:
• Are mobile devices; some are slow-moving, while others are fast-moving.
• Cannot report their position because they are not equipped with a GPS system. We have this assumption because nodes may falsify their position, and position effects spectrum occupancy scenario. Hence, we propose a method that obviate the requirement of a node to report its position.
• The transmission and reception range of a mobile device can be different.
• The transmission range depends on the residual power of each mobile device and may change in time as the power reserves are depleted.
We assume that the malicious nodes in the real network are a minority and their behaviour is captured by the following assumptions:
• The misbehaving nodes are malicious, rather than selfish; their only objective is to hinder the activity of other nodes whenever possible, a behaviour distinct from the one of selfish nodes motivated to gain some advantage.
• The malicious nodes are uniformly distributed in the area we investigate.
• The malicious nodes do not collaborate in their attack strategies.
• The malicious nodes change the intensity of their Byzantine attack in successive time slots; similar patterns of malicious behaviour are easy to detect and an intelligent attacker is motivated to avoid detection.
We conceptualise N circular rings around each P k and use a majority voting rule for a particular ring around a primary transmitter; where the global decision regarding the occupancy of a channel requires a majority of the votes. Since the malicious nodes are a minority and they are uniformly distributed, the malicious nodes in any of the rings are also a minority; thus a ring-based majority fusion is a representative of accurate occupancy for the channel associated with the ring.
All secondary nodes are required to register first and then to transmit periodically their current power level, as well as their occupancy report for each one of the K channels. As mentioned in the introductory discussion, the secondary nodes connect to the cloud using the cellular network. After a mobile device is registered the cloud application requests the cellular network to detect its location; the towers of the cellular network detect the location of a mobile device by triangulation with an accuracy which is a function of the environment and is of the order of 10 metres. The location of the mobile device is reported to the cloud application every time they provide an occupancy report.
The nodes which do not participate in the trust computation will not register in this cloud-based version of the resource management algorithm thus, do not get the occupancy report and cannot use it to identify possible rogue nodes through trust map or use trust as a reference for robust fusion of results; obviously, if a secondary node does not register it cannot influence other nodes and prevent them from using free channels, or tempt them to use busy channels.
In the registration phase a secondary node transmits its MAC addresses and the cloud responds with the tuple (Δ, δ s ); Δ is the time interval between two consecutive reports, chosen to minimise the communication, as well as, the overhead for sensing the status of each channel. To reduce the communication overhead secondary nodes should only transmit the changes from the previous status report. If there are no changes, a node will abstain from sending status reports, but it can only be silent for a predefined time interval. δ s < Δ is the time interval to the first report expected from the secondary node. This scheme provides a pseudo-synchronisation so that the data collected by the cloud and used to determine the trust is based on observations made by the secondary nodes at about the same time.
The history-based algorithm
The cloud computes the probable distance 
Node i will most likely report the status of several channels k ∈ C i (t q ); then quantities
and .
Finally, the global trust in node i is
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The trust in each node at each iteration is determined using a similar strategy as the one discussed earlier; its status report, S j (t), contains only information about the channels it can report on and only if the information has changed from the previous reporting cycle. Then a statistical analysis of the random variables for a window of time W, ζ j (t q ), t q ∈ W allows us to compute the moments as well as a 5% the confidence interval. Based on these results we assess if node j is trustworthy and eliminate the untrustworthy ones when we evaluate the occupancy map at the next cycle. We continue to assess the trustworthy of all nodes and may accept the information from node j when its behaviour changes.
Let us now discuss the use of historical information to evaluate the trust. We assume a sliding window W(t q ) consists of n w time slots. Given two decay constants, k 1 and k 2 with k 1 + k 2 = 1 we use an exponential averaging giving decreasing weight to old observations. We choose k 1 << k 2 to ensure that mismatches which is index of dishonesty harms to a nodes cumulative trust. Such nodes attack only intermittently and try to disguise their presence with occasional good reports; the misbehaviour should affect the trust more than the good actions. The history-based trust requires the determination of two quantities
Then the history-based trust for node i valid only at times t q ≥ n w τ is:
For times t q < n w τ the trust will be based only on a subset of observations rather than a full window on n w observations.
A simulation study of history-based trust management algorithm
The aim of the history-based trust evaluation is to distinguish between trustworthy and malicious nodes. We expect the ratio of malicious to trustworthy nodes as well as node density to play an important role in this decision. The node density ρ is the number of nodes per unit of the area; in our simulation experiments the size of the area is constant but the number of nodes increases from 500 to 2,000 thus, the node density increases by a factor of four. α, the ratio of the number of malicious to the total number of nodes varies between α = 0.2 to a worst case of α = 0.6.
The performance metrics we consider are: the average trust for all nodes, the average trust of individual nodes, and the error of honest/trustworthy nodes. We wish to see how the algorithm behaves when the density of the nodes increase; we consider four cases with 500, 1,000, 1, 500 and 2, 000 nodes on the same area thus, we allow the density to increase by a factor of four. We also investigate the average trust when α, the ratio of malicious nodes to the total number of nodes increases from α = 0.2 to α = 0.4 and, finally, to α = 0.6.
The objectives of our studies are to understand the limitations of the algorithm and to assess its performance.
The simulation environment
The simulation reported in this section uses AWS, the Amazon Web Services. The 80 channels, one for each primary transmitter, are divided into four groups of 20 channels each; each group is assigned to one cloud instance. An instance is a t1.micro EC2 running a 32-bit Linux image. In our experiments we used five EC2 instances along with an S3 bucket; four EC2 instances are assigned the trust computation for the 80 channels and the fifth instance is a controller.
The application is based on the single program multiple data (SPMD) paradigm, all instances run the same program, but on different data. An instance uses as input the location of the 20 primaries operating in the region of the spectrum corresponding to the 20 channels assigned to the instance; all instances share the geographical position of all the secondary nodes. An instance is able to know the position of each secondary node in the rings associated to every primary transmitter assigned to it and carry out the history-based trust evaluation algorithm described in Section 3.3.
The outputs of the program are trust evidence stored in an S3 bucket. The controller instance retrieves individual trust evidence deposited by the four worker instances in the S3 bucket to maintain the history-based trust for the network.
A straightforward data partitioning strategy based on node location which may work well for distributed ad hoc networks is not a reasonable one for the centralised algorithm because it would lead to excessive communication among the cloud instances. Individual nodes may contribute data regarding primary transmitters in a different sub-area; to evaluate the trust of each node the cloud instances would have to exchange a fair amount of information. This data partitioning would also complicate our algorithm which groups together secondaries based on the distance from the primary.
Instead, we allocate to each instance a number of channels and all instances share the information about the geographic position of each node; the distance of a secondary to any primary can then be computed easily. This data partitioning strategy scales well in the number of primaries thus, it is suitable for simulation in large metropolitan areas but may not be able to accommodate cases when the number of secondaries is of the order of 10 8 -10 9 .
The effect of the malicious versus trustworthy node ratio on the average trust of node groups
In this section we report on the effect of the malicious versus trustworthy node ratio on the average trust as the number of nodes increases. The average trust is computed separately for the two classes of nodes (all malicious nodes and honest nodes) and allows us to determine if the algorithm is able to clearly separate them.
Recall that the area is constant; hence when the number of nodes increases so does the node density. First, we consider two extreme cases; the malicious nodes represent only 20% of the total number of nodes and an unrealistically high presence, 60%. Then we report on the average trust when the number of nodes is fixed and the malicious nodes represent an increasing fraction of the total number of nodes.
Low malicious/trustworthy node ratio
Figure 2(a) shows that when the malicious nodes represent only 20% of all nodes there is a clear distinction between the two groups, malicious nodes with an average trust over all nodes of 0.28 and trustworthy nodes with an average trust index of 0.91, regardless of the number of nodes. 
Note: There is clear distinction between the two classes of nodes regardless of the node density in the former case; in the second case the distinction becomes more pronounced as the number of nodes increases.
High malicious/trustworthy node ratio
When the malicious nodes represent 60% of all the nodes then the number of nodes plays a significant role; when the number of nodes is small the two groups cannot be distinguished their average trust index is almost equal, 0.55 although the honest nodes have a slightly more average trust value. When the number of nodes increases to 2,000 and node density increases four folds then the average trust of the first (malicious) group decreases to 0.45 and for the second (honest) group it increases to about 0.68, as seen in Figure 2 (b). This result is not unexpected; it only shows the fact that the history-based algorithm is able to classify the nodes properly even when the malicious nodes are a majority a situation we do not expect to encounter in practice. This effect is somewhat surprising; we did not expect that under these extreme condition the average of the trust of all nodes will be so different for the two groups. A possible explanation is that our strategy to reward constant good behaviour, rather than occasional good behaviour, designed to mask the true intentions of a malicious node, works well.
Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) show the average trust function of α, the ratio of malicious versus total number of nodes. The results confirm the behaviour discussed earlier; we see a clear separation of the two classes only when the malicious nodes are in minority. When the density of malicious nodes approaches a high value so that they are in majority, the algorithm still performs as evident from the figure that the average trust for honest nodes even at high value of α is more than malicious nodes. Thus the trusts reflect the aim of isolating the malicious from the honest set of nodes. We also observe that the separation is more clear when the number of nodes in the network increase. Notes: As long as malicious nodes represent 50% or less of the total number of nodes the average trust of malicious nodes is below 0.3, while the one of trustworthy nodes is above 0.9 in a scale of 0 to 1.0. As the number of nodes increases, the distance between the average trust of the two classes becomes larger and even larger when α > 0.5. i.e., fraction of malicious nodes are greater than majority. 
Notes: As long as malicious nodes represent 50% or less of the total number of nodes the average trust of malicious nodes is below 0.3, while the one of trustworthy nodes is above 0.9 in a scale of 0 to 1.0. As the number of nodes increases, the distance between the average trust of the two classes becomes larger and even larger when α > 0.5. i.e., fraction of malicious nodes are greater than majority.
The effect of the malicious versus trustworthy node ratio on the average trust of individual nodes
So far we have reported the average trust over the set of all nodes considered as a group. Now we shall consider a more important indicator for the history-based algorithm, the average trust of individual nodes. This metrics is an average based on the accuracy of the information a node supplies to the service, computed following the procedure discussed in Section 3.3. As before we consider two extreme cases, low and high population of malicious nodes. Figures 4(a) , 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d) show the average trust of individual nodes when the malicious nodes represent 20% of all nodes and the number of nodes is: 500, 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000, respectively. As we can see, the two classes of nodes can be easily distinguished; the average trust of malicious nodes does not exceed 0.4, while the average trust of trustworthy nodes seldom falls below 0.7. The node density does not seem to affect significantly the distribution of the average trust. The fact that we see clear distinction between the honest and malicious nodes is an index of robustness to node density. Notes: The number of nodes is: (a) 500, (b) 1,000, (c) 1,500 and (d) 2,000. The two classes are well separated only when there are 2,000 nodes; then the average trust of malicious nodes does not exceed 0.5, while the trustworthy nodes display an average trust better than 0.6 for the large majority, with a few between 0.6 and 0.55. 
Notes: The number of nodes is: (a) 500, (b) 1,000, (c) 1,500 and (d) 2,000. The two classes are well separated only when there are 2,000 nodes; then the average trust of malicious nodes does not exceed 0.5, while the trustworthy nodes display an average trust better than 0.6 for the large majority, with a few between 0.6 and 0.55.
Figures 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) show the average trust of individual nodes when the malicious nodes represent 60% of all nodes and the number of nodes is: 500, 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000, respectively. In this case we expected the algorithm to fail to distinguish malicious from trustworthy nodes. This is indeed the case for a small number of nodes where there is a very low node density; but the two classes are separated for 1,000 nodes. The separation is clearer as the number of nodes/node density increases. See Figures 5(c) and 5(d) for results for 1,500 and 2,000. This shows again that the algorithm is robust under extreme condition of high malicious node density.
The average error
We distinguish between errors made by honest nodes and false reports provided by malicious nodes. The percentage of the average errors made by honest nodes is another performance metric we report; this figure is calculated by averaging over the 80 channels and for malicious node ratios in the range α = 0.2 to α = 0.6.
The plots in Figures 6 and 7 show this error for honest nodes. Figure 6 shows that when the population size increases from 500 to 2,000 nodes this error decreases.
Figure 6
The percentage error of honest nodes when the population size increases from 500 to 2,000 nodes (see online version for colours)
As we can see in Figure 7 this error is constant and small when α ≤ 0.5 and then increases linearly with a higher slope when the population is small, 500 nodes, and has a smallest slope when the population reaches 2,000 nodes. 
Figure 8
The evolution in time of the average trust of malicious nodes; they start the attacks after the first 15 time slots and at that point they lower their average trust (see online version for colours)
Note: The population size is 2,000 nodes.
Figure 9
Note: The population size is 500 nodes.
The resilience to attacks of the algorithm
So far we have considered random attacks with a random probability of attack Pattack in time, but the algorithm is resilient to more sophisticated attacks of the malicious nodes. Indeed, the history-based algorithm defeats the strategy used by malicious nodes to concentrate their attacks in the later slots of a time window. We programmed the malicious nodes to behave conservatively for the first 15 time slots and then start attacking with increased probability; which changes on each slot randomly to confuse and defy the detection of any pattern for malicious behaviour. Figures 8 and 9 show the average trusts of malicious nodes when the population size is 2,000 and 500 nodes, respectively. We see that the average trust is high for the first 15 slots and it decays as they start attacking; moreover this evolution of the average trust is invariant to the population size. We conclude that the history-based algorithm is able to detect malicious nodes with this type of behaviour regardless of the population size.
Conclusions and future work
The wide-spread acceptance of cloud computing is conditioned by the development of new applications which can take advantage of the cloud elasticity, the ability to promptly respond to the demands of an application and provide additional resources when they are needed. Cloud services for mobile devices is an areas where we expect a significant increase in demand. Indeed, mobile devices such as smart phones, tablets, and laptops have a limited amount of resources, including power reserves and are able to generate vast amounts of data including text, audio, and video that has to archived and processed on systems with adequate storage and processing capacity (Marinescu, 2013) . This is the motivation for the cloud service introduced in this paper which relies heavily on the cloud elasticity, as the load is expected to vary greatly depending on the time of the day and the geographic location.
Computer clouds provide an ideal environment for the effective evaluation of new algorithms and network resource management strategies. To compare different algorithms for resource management and, in particular, for trust management for CRNs we can run concurrently multiple scenarios. Several instances running concurrently on a cloud, e.g., the elastic computing (EC2) of Amazon (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/), allow us to experiment with the model of the system, as well as with the algorithm; each instance could use a different model of the physical system or a different set of parameters of the algorithm. Multiple instances can also be used when we wish to study networks with a very large number of nodes spread over a vast geographic area and to investigate the effect of node density.
The research effort dedicated to CRNs is justified by increased network complexity, the rapid development of wireless networks, and quality of service (QoS) requirements. Trust determination is a critical issue for CRNs; indeed, all secondary nodes compete for free channels and the information one node may provide to its neighbours could be deliberately distorted.
The cognitive network literature has been focused on cooperative spectrum sensing where the spectrum decision is made by each node based upon fusion of information from a number of nodes in its vicinity. Distributed algorithms for trust evaluation require a set of unrealistic assumptions; at the same time individual nodes must carry out fairly complex computations and communicate with the largest group of its neighbours it can reach to base its decisions on as much sensing data as possible.
A cloud service for trust management in cognitive networks can have multiple technical as well as economical benefits. The service is likely to have a broader impact that the one discussed in this paper, it could be used to support a range of important policies in wireless network where many decisions require the cooperation of all nodes.
A history-based algorithm to evaluate the trust and detect with high probability malicious nodes is at the centre of the solution we propose. The algorithm has a number of potential advantages including: 1 reduces drastically the computations a mobile device is required to carry out, as well as the messages sent and received, to identify free channels 2 the data provided by the cloud is based on information from all secondary nodes reporting on a communication channel used by a primary, not only those in its vicinity 3 the dishonest nodes can be detected with high probability and historic data could help detect a range of Byzantine attacks orchestrated by a group of malicious nodes.
The simulation of the history-based algorithm reported in Section 4 uses multiple instances running on Amazon's EC2. Elasticity is critical for a real-life CRN trust management service, as the load varies drastically depending on the time of the day and on the density of the devices at a given location. High-density areas such as a stadium at the time of game, or a shopping mall at midday on a weekend, require considerably more computational and storage resources than the average resources needed at other times.
A straightforward location-based data partitioning strategy is not suitable for the history-based algorithm, it would lead to excessive communication among the cloud instances. Indeed in the history-based algorithms individual nodes may contribute data regarding primary transmitters in a different sub-area; to evaluate the trust of each node the cloud instances would have to exchange a fair amount of information. This data partitioning would also complicate our algorithm which groups together secondaries based on the distance from the primary.
Instead, we allocate to each instance a number of channels and all instances share the information about the geographic position of each node; the distance of a secondary to any primary can then be computed easily. This data partitioning strategy scales well in the number of primaries thus, it is suitable for simulation in large metropolitan areas, but may not be able to accommodate cases when the number of secondaries is larger than 10 8 . The simulation results for the history-based algorithm show that as long as malicious nodes represent 50% or less of the total number of nodes, α < 0.5, the average trust of malicious nodes is below 0.3, while the one of trustworthy nodes is above 0.9 on a scale of 0 to 1.0. As the number of nodes increases, the distance between the average trust of the two classes becomes larger and larger even when the ratio on untrustworthy nodes exceeds 50%.
The two classes of nodes are clearly separated when α = 0.2, the malicious nodes represent only 20% of the total number of nodes; then, the average trust of trustworthy nodes is not lower than 0.7, while the average trust of malicious nodes is not larger than 0.4. When α = 0.6 the two classes of nodes are well separated only if there are 2,000 nodes; then the average trust of malicious nodes does not exceed 0.5, while the trustworthy nodes display an average trust better than 0.6 for the large majority, with a few between 0.6 and 0.55.
The honest nodes do not change their behaviour in time, while the malicious nodes do. This is reflected in the evolution in time of the average trust, virtually constant for the honest nodes and highly variable for the malicious ones. The malicious nodes concentrate their attacks in the early slots of the time window to minimise the impact of their misbehaviour on their average trust. For the first 15 slots the malicious nodes attack only on 50% to 55% of the channels (that is the minimum for a malicious node), hence their trust values are higher than 0.4 which was observed in the simulation where random attacks were considered.
In the future we plan to investigate the resilience of the history-based algorithm to more sophisticated types of Byzantine attacks. So far, we have not addressed collaborative attacks where several malicious nodes provide false sensing for a channel and make it more difficult for the fusion centre to identify the state of that channel; we plan to extend our studies to cover such attacks. We have considered only hyper aggressive malicious nodes, when the probability of attack in any given slot is P attack > 0.5; we shall consider in the future selfish nodes that attack intermittently with P attack < 0.5. We also plan to investigate more sophisticated history update rules to reduce the overhead of computation, but still able to capture a dishonest behaviour.
